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Shakespeare's Polonius announces the kinds of drama offered by the players Hamlet has invited.
The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-
comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral, scene 
indivisible, or poem unlimited. (Hamlet, act II, scene 2)
This multiplication is based on accepted types of drama. Any set of social or artistic or 
behavioral norms can generate new types by combining the old. We have rock, rap, country 
music, country-rock, and could have country-rap. But changes can go far beyond this, providing 
new types to be combined and new modes of combination. Goethe's Faust is none of the player 
king's types, and then Beckett invents more. Impressionists and post-impressionists did not just 
add to the genres of painting; they changed the goals and practices of painting so that older 
genres were redefined in the new context. Modern capitalism and representative democracy 
brought new modes of social individuation, new kinds of associations, new dimensions of 
combination and mutation. The whole space of possible actions was reconfigured.
As moderns or postmoderns we cherish such novelty. We live within ranges of normatively 
sorted possibilities, from explicit social rules to artistic genres and scientific methods, from 
language rules to codes of law to appropriate behaviors for courthouses and ballparks. Norms 
define acceptable individuals and actions: more tightly in the law and older norms of politeness, 
less so with recent politeness norms and artistic genres.
With the shattering of the ideal of an static traditional society, we expect changes in such norms. 
The changes come sometimes with fanfare, sometimes in ways unnoticed until later retrospection 
reveals them. They accelerate as older norms are experienced as restrictive. Yet novelty by itself 
is not always good. Merely replacing old by new systems of government or artistic genres is not 
enough. If galactic aliens arrived and enforced on us a new religion or social system, the novelty 
alone would not make that change something to be approved. If art moved towards more 
restrictive artistic genres, or society toward less social mobility, such novelty might not be 
welcomed. We hope for changes that enlarge the space of possible actions.
In what sense can the space of possibility be enlarged? When the rule of castling was introduced 
into the game of chess, the game changed. It was possible physically to have moved chess pieces 
in a castling way before, but it would not have been possible within the rules of the game. 
Austin's observations about when performatives succeed are apropos here. Speaking strictly, 
what is achievable after a change of norms was possible beforehand, though not approved or 
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allowable moves, though it was included in the larger space of possible arrangements of pieces 
of wood on the board.  Impressionism was possible in 1500, in the sense that paint could have 
been laid on canvas in those patterns. But its real possibility had to wait for social and artistic 
developments to make room for its act of making new room. 
We would like to understand new possibilities and norms as resolving tensions or meeting unmet 
needs. What the new completes or improves may not be an explicit aspect of the previous set of 
normative practices. It could be an implicit problem or unnoticed contradiction. Yet the new 
should not just be extruded from the old by an algorithmic process or inertial continuation. It 
should be more than a recombination of elements already present. We hope for genuinely novel 
expansions of possibility that yet remain authentic to what we have been.
The most familiar notion of "authenticity" demands that an individual or society stay faithful to 
some normative content. This might be an individual's ideals or family tradition. It might be a 
social patrimony of values, roles, practices, institutions, or teachings. But through time in the 
history of the individual or the society, the patrimony must be handed on to future selves or 
generations. There is no avoiding the hermeneutic task of interpreting, and perhaps reforming or 
attempting a return to some original meaning of the patrimony. But then the problem of defining 
the criteria of authenticity challenges the direction of any reinterpretation. 
If authenticity is seen as involving a fixed patrimony, then change will be an external event that 
happens to that content. An authentic core is to be sheltered from the change, but skepticism 
attends any attempt to define that core or its legitimate successors. 
However, there is another way to envision authenticity. Social  formations could be seen as 
concretions within some larger process that itself provides guidance. It can do so, not because the 
process has a fixed goal that provides a criterion, but because the process has internal conditions, 
structures, or moments that demand their own expression. 
In the following sections I take Hegel as an example of this way of conceiving authenticity. I 
make some references as well to Deleuze, a most resolute anti-Hegelian. Though Deleuze would 
violently repudiate the historical directionality of Hegel's analyses, they share an approach to 
authenticity where the "being" of the current social formation comes in a process with moments 
or aspects that should be made explicit elements in our social formations. The goal of 
authenticity might acquire some bite from these ideas, so that it could help judge changes that go 
beyond recombinations of the past.
 
Hegel and Change
Hegel attempts to think social and artistic changes that provide both novelty and continuity. His 
dialectical investigations present a self-developing structure of concepts and follow temporal 
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nonetheless deals with tensions in earlier formations.
In his treatments, changes are not just added on to what went before. Each new logical concept 
reconfigures the whole, each new shape of spirit redefines everything in the practice of thought 
or art or society. Basic notions of individuality change, as do the kinds of relations and 
combinations that are possible. Such novelty is deeper than combinatorial play with previously 
defined individuals and relations.
Hegel is applauded for providing novelty that goes beyond recombinations of the past. But he is 
accused of reabsorbing the changes into a unitary developmental process. Hegel's situation is 
more complex, though, and even if we doubt his overall program we can learn from his treatment 
of normative change. There are three features in his approach that are relevant: how goals are 
conceived, how forms are related, and how the process posits its own form.
First, Hegel argues that while there are ongoing goals for the overall series of changes, those 
goals are not adequately describable by the earlier formations in the series. The dialectic 
introduces structures and norms that are unthinkable in terms of earlier structures that they 
encompass and replace.1 For instance, Hegel thinks that fully actualized and institutionalized 
human freedom is the goal of history, but that this goal cannot be adequately conceived until it is 
well nigh achieved. Particular changes are also new: Roman citizenship could not be understood 
nor predicted in terms of Greek city membership. Medieval cathedral sculpture will not fit the 
concepts or practices appropriate for Greek temple sculpture, and neither of them can show art's 
ultimate self-transcendence. We come to self-presence within systems of thought and practices of 
politics and culture that are already underway trying to accomplish their own explicit goals, but 
which are stages of processes that turn out to have fuller goals, though those goals are not 
graspable within the current formation.
Second, Hegel sees the structures of a given intellectual or artistic or social formation as 
themselves inclining toward change. It is not necessary to shock them from outside. A social 
formation can be described abstractly as embodying this or that complex pattern or structure. But 
for Hegel this is not an adequate description. The connections of the abstract pattern must also be 
seen, and those connections go beyond similarities and differences. Abstract patterns and 
structures have their own internal tensions and mutually constitutive relations with those they 
arise from and those they transition into within a larger process that supports the being of any 
formation. These continuities and connections go beyond resemblance and formal overlaps, since 
they are in an order of connection and generation. The process, as the condition for the 
possibility and existence of the current formation, also brings the novelty that will transform that 
formation. Hegel's logic follows a series of conceptual structures as they reveal their constitutive 
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1 For example, in Hegel's logic, the paired categories in the second section (ground and grounded, 
essence and appearance, cause and effect, and the like) are not extensions of the single categories of the 
first section (quality, quantity, and the like), and neither section can properly enunciate the full goal of the 
logic.
4relations with their opposites and their mutual dependencies within larger structures.2 Dynamism 
does not need to be added from the outside, since the conditions for the stability of a current 
formation also require or offer novelty.
Third, and most important for this essay, the process of form and change develops towards its 
own self-presentation. Hegel argues that the final content of the process of development will be 
the explicit manifestation of all the moments that comprise the form of that process. What exists 
as philosophies, arts, or institutions is not a collection of finished or static results of the process 
of thought and social development, but rather is that process showing itself to itself. The process 
is defined neither by its present shape nor by any static structure. The process of manifestation 
manifests itself.
The manifestation of itself to itself is therefore itself the content of spirit and not, as it 
were, only a form externally added to the content; consequently spirit, by its 
manifestation, does not manifest a content different from its form, but manifests its form 
which expresses the entire content of spirit, namely, its self-manifestation. In spirit, 
therefore, form and content are identical with each other. (Encyclopedia  383z) 
All that remains here as form for the idea is the method of this content -- the determinate 
knowing of the currency of its moments. (Encyclopedia 236) 
The absolute idea has for its content only this, that the form determining is its own 
fulfilled totality, the pure concept. (The Science of Logic 825) 
The process of thought and socially-mediated self-consciousness manifests itself by positing its 
own motions and moments. To posit a moment is more than to become aware of it. It is to let that  
moment be the dominant feature of a formation, after which it will be taken up explicitly into a 
more complex whole.3 
In this way, the method is not an external form, but the soul and the concept of the 
content. It is distinct from the content only inasmuch as the moments of the concept, each 
in itself, in its determinacy, reach the point where they appear as the totality of the 
concept. Since this determinacy, or the content, leads itself back, along with the form, to 
the idea, the latter presents itself as a systematic totality, which is only one idea. Its 
particular moments are in-themselves this same [idea]; and equally, through the dialectic 
of the concept, they produce the simple being-for-self of the idea. -- as a result the 
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than in the logic itself. 
3 "True spirit, however, is just this unity of the absolutely separate moments, and, indeed, it is just 
through the free actuality of these self-less extremes that, as their middle term, it achieves a concrete 
existence." (Phenomenology of Spirit 521) 
5science [of logic] concludes by grasping the concept of itself as the concept of the pure 
idea for which the idea is. (Encyclopedia 243, my emphasis)
In philosophy, some particular concept of reality or subjectivity can be central in a philosophical 
system, then be redefined as a subordinate aspect of a new system. Hegel sees these 
developments in actual fact as well as in the pure thought of logic. In politics, for instance, 
authoritative unified subjectivity appears as royal power, which has its day and then is reduced to 
a functioning aspect of the more supple whole of constitutional monarchy. Genres of art, ethical 
systems, and sets of social institutions all emphasize different moments as they refigure their 
overall process. 
Hegel's logic aims to provide the basic moments of spirit's process. It defines a self-coincidence 
which is not from any one subject position but is the self-presentation of the process that 
generates subject positions. The overall logical form of the process tells Hegel what moments 
need to be explicitly posited. But this overall logical form must then be itself treated in terms of 
itself, that is, the abstract form of the process must be explicitly posited as a "real" process in 
appropriate spheres of objectivity, and so fully developed and brought to itself.4
This is not some mysterious ontological dynamism but the process of thought and socially-
mediated self-consciousness coming to be and know itself. Less adequate normative formations 
cannot handle the self-reflections and intertwined moments involved. In social structures, 
inadequacies show up as a growing inability to provide full freedom to individuals who are 
nonetheless becoming more defined by that freedom. In art, inadequacies show up when artistic 
content and form refuse to fit well together, and the role of the artist becomes unstable. In 
philosophy, inadequacies show up as an increasing inability to take fixed categories and binary 
oppositions as final even while they are being asserted. No pattern is stable unless it has 
explicitly posited all the mediations and moments necessary for its own existence, and those 
usually lead beyond it.
As Hegel turns to nature and history, the patterns from the logic show up in governmental 
institutions, the history of religions, the basic functions of organisms, and so on. Critics charge 
that Hegel is applying what amounts to an algorithm for the generation of normative formations. 
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4 The logic is not useful for guiding future developments,  because the explicit knowledge of the logical 
moments comes late in the game, and also because Hegel does not think that historical change is 
consciously guided. The rational present was to transform itself, and Hegel did not think in terms of 
avant-garde groups leading the way. He was at best very cautious about the self-appointed artistic and 
political radicals of his day. The major motors of change in society and thought do not operate under 
conscious control; self-awareness is more a result than a cooperating cause. In the preface to his 
Philosophy of Right Hegel famously urged us to seek the rose in the cross of the present, and he claimed 
that whatever is effective and actual is by that very fact also deeply rational. He seems to urge quiet 
acquiescence since "whatever is, is right." Yet we know that Hegel also wrote extensively about the 
inadequacies of German political and social systems, and that he worked with government bureaucrats 
and students who sought significant changes. Comprehension is retrospective, yet it can enable criticism. 
Once a new formation is coming into being, for instance democratic constitutional government, it can be 
invoked to criticize lagging institutions, as Hegel did for German governmental arrangements. 
6There are some defenses that Hegel can offer. One is that the overall logical form of the process 
is not available until the final moments in the process. Thus there is no distant meta-view; no 
algorithm is applied from the outside. Another is that the moments of the process are embodied 
within contingent detail. Once he is faced with a particular historical formation, such as the 
politics of his native Württemburg, or a proposal such as the English reform bill, Hegel can 
compare the situation or the proposal to the requirements for the full positing of the form of the 
social process, and so make criticisms and suggestions. But he cannot move from the a priori 
structures to concrete details, for these latter are truly contingent. 
Whatever the success of these defenses, there are also more sweeping objections that can be 
raised about the success of Hegel's logical closure and transparency, and against the necessity of 
his list of moments. In this essay I am not trying to judge Hegel against these and other charges, 
though I doubt that his project can fully succeed. I want rather to point out that whatever the 
success of his particular project, his ideas provide lessons worth considering when we are trying 
to elaborate a concept of social authenticity.
This essay explores the idea that by positing the moments5 of their own process, intellectual, 
artistic, and social formations could expand their possibilities, and so could arrive at normative 
formations that are truer to the way that norms come about. The results would be more authentic. 
In what follows, I first investigate how a normative formation can be expanded through the 
positing of the form of its process.6 Then I ask whether such expansion always produces a better 
formation. Then I consider whether deviations from Hegel undermine the effort to learn from 
him, and close with a few remarks about the situation today.
Positing Moments
Positing is not a self-interpretation performed in the privacy of one's mind or in the implicit self-
consciousness of a group. It puts a moment "out there" in public as recognized in the explicit 
working of an institution or a cultural practice. This is more than a linguistic act, though it could 
happen through the development of institutionalized linguistic practices. Aspects of a normative 
formation which were subordinate and somewhat indefinite become more prominent and 
explicitly defined, and the whole formation reconfigures. This expands the set of norms, since 
new explicit dimensions of action become recognized and governed.
One way of describing this expansion, taken from physics, might be to say that it complicates the 
state space set up by a system of norms. A set of elements (which could be types or individuals) 
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Hegelian sense, I will continue to use the word as a placeholder for whatever a particular analysis reveals 
to be the internal structure of the process.
6 I am ignoring Hegel's discussion of how moments are posited in nature, and concentrating on social and 
artistic formations, although the non-Hegelian examples I suggest, Deleuze and Whitehead, do apply their 
ideas to  nature as well as to social and artistic examples.
7plus their qualities and relations create an abstract space containing all the possible states the 
system could be in. For instance, two individuals, each of which could have either of two 
qualities, generate four possible descriptions of the whole. Individuals A and B, each of whom 
can be either blue or red, give four possible system states AbBb, AbBr, ArBb, ArBr.)  Add 
relations (A could be above or below B) and the number of combinations multiplies. This could 
be imagined as a space with a dimension and axis for each quality. The system as a whole would 
then occupy one location in this abstract space, and its changes could be mapped as a trajectory 
through this space of states. The state space, no matter how complex, depends on the 
specification of the initial individuals or types and measurable qualities. "Measurable" here need 
not refer to scientific measurement -- instead of a physical system, think of a system of etiquette 
rules. This system sets up a space of possible actions. Each addition of a new individual (say, 
single parents) or a new type or a new quality (say, Friday informal dress) adds a dimension to 
the whole space and enlarges the number of possible states for the system. Norms identify 
preferred regions of this state space. More radical changes may reconfigure all the dimensions of 
the state space. This will likely enlarge the total repertory of possible actions available to a 
society but it might also, for instance in a modern bureaucracy, reduce the number of possibilities 
open to a single individual, because the new roles had more tightly defined spheres of operation.
Such changes are not primarily those personal self-redefinitions that revolutionize an individual's 
life history. Hegel would say that the content of such new selves is not an individual product; the 
alterations move within an intersubjective space of alternatives that has been enlarged through 
other than individual creativity. Similarly, authenticity to process will not be primarily a quality 
of a particular individual. It is on the social level that the process can make its own structure and 
movement actual for itself, in the development of forms for life that are truer to the way that 
action possibilities and norms come to happen.
In Hegel's aesthetics artworks always unite form and content, but in the first phase of art, 
symbolic art, the issue of the adequacy of form to content is not a matter of concern. With the 
development of classical art, a proper balance of content and form becomes an explicit norm. In 
romantic art, the action of social and individual subjectivity in going beyond the union of form 
and content becomes explicitly recognized, although it was implicitly functioning all along. With 
each phase the self-interpretation of what artists do changes, and the institutional norms change 
as well, so the space of possible art works is reconfigured. In politics, the moments Hegel 
describes as the universal, particular, and individual are present in any formation, but as they are 
explicitly recognized and given interacting institutional roles, government moves from tribal 
leadership towards a representative democracy with intricately intertwined governmental agents.
But we need not stay with Hegel for examples. Gilles Deleuze would never be labeled Hegelian, 
and his concepts of identity, sense, and possibility are very far from Hegel, yet there are parallels 
in his thought to the motions just described. Deleuze offers an ontology of events which, though 
it has no dialectical moments in Hegel's sense, has interacting elements (pre-individual 
singularities and forces, Ideas, concepts, problems, etc.) These are active in the being of any 
normative formation. There is no goal-oriented historical development, but some normative 
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to create individual and social structures which embody this interplay more explicitly. Avant-
garde art is an example, where the explicit creation-discovery of new possibilities becomes an 
institutional norm.8 
Oppression for Deleuze is not just a matter of particular factual structures getting in the way of 
particular wills and desires. A society organized as much as possible in terms of striated space 
and its social analogues is oppressive, for Deleuze, not just because of factual repressions of this 
or that particular desire, but because that sort of society ignores or represses constitutive 
elements of the process that allows societies to exist at all. The mode of being of any structure is 
within a process that is "for" novelty and new intensities. We are called to be that newness and so 
to create normative formations that allow us to enact the whole process more explicitly.
Deleuze's notions, applied to institutions, challenge the modernization that Hegel applauds. 
Rational transparency is seen as limiting human possibilities by imposing centralized and striated 
systems that classify and assign to each a fixed place, caging the dynamism of individual and 
pre-individual desires. Still, while Deleuze's writings are full of images of flight, nomadism, 
schizoid break-outs, and anti-systems, total discontinuity is not a goal.9
Hegel distrusts the notion of genius and other eruptions, preferring to see individual insights as 
part of rational social processes. Deleuze on the other hand sees rationality as a normalizing 
pressure on individual and social eruptive events of new forces and wills. What I want to point 
out is that despite their opposed orientations both Hegel and Deleuze affirm a self-becoming 
process whose interacting elements or moments need to be explicitly and publicly posited within 
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also develops an ontology of events in which various factors (eternal objects, creativity, past formations, 
subjective aim, etc.) cooperate in any concrete actual entity. He too urges us to develop social structures 
and artistic practices that make more room for the explicit interplay of these elements, and in so doing 
increase the sphere of possible actions and creative expressions.  (See, for instance, Whitehead's 
discussions in the later chapters of Adventures of Ideas.)
8 See Deleuze's analyses in Difference and Repetition  and the comparative evaluations of cinematic 
forms and social realities in Cinema 1 and 2. His institutional judgments are most fully expressed in A 
Thousand Plateaus. There is no doubt that talking about Deleuze in the context of Hegel tends to present 
Deleuze as more rationalistic and more interested in continuity than he really is. But making corrections 
by talking more about bodies, forces, breaks, and becomings will only emphasize further that Deleuze has 
a theory of the becoming of normative formations that wants to have all its elements recognized and 
functioning explicitly. I am not suggesting that Deleuze derives this from Hegel; both of them are 
dependent on Spinoza and Leibniz for the basic strategy.
9 "Staying stratified, organized, signified, subjected--is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can 
happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us 
heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the 
opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, 
possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of 
intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times." (A Thousand Plateaus 161)
9normative formations to allow for full freedom. In both cases an enlargement of normative 
formations occurs through explicitly positing the underlying process's moments and elements.
Authenticity and Value
But is there any reason to conclude that such changes lead to normative formations that are better 
than the earlier ones? Do such expansions automatically produce normative formations that 
should be valued more highly?
An enlargement of possibilities may remove an earlier restriction, perhaps one unfelt until the 
new space opened up. But is it enough to show that some restrictions has been lifted? Why 
should this be better? It fits with modern sensibilities, but that does not establish that it was an 
improvement. The enlargement of possibilities might dilute and dehumanize, as with the 
increasing specialization of factory labor. Or it might open up a nihilistic expansion leading away  
from any concentrated goals and towards a consumerist thirst for novelty without significance.
One possible response to such worries might be to seek an independent criterion that 
distinguished those cases when expansion and complexification were positive values. Hegel 
argues that they are positive when at the service of authentic freedom defined in terms of the 
rational self-presence of the whole process. He avoids endless dilution by finding structures that 
close upon themselves, though they leave open their lower level determinations. Deleuze sees the 
value of expansion and complexity depending in Nietzschean fashion on the type and direction 
of the willed intensity. He favors openness over closure, but with the proviso that affirmative 
forces repeat and maintain generous intensity.
Another response might be to dodge the question by claiming that what should be judged better 
or not, virtuous or not, is not the normative formation itself but particular paths through the space 
of possible actions it opens. This leads to familiar debates about relativism and about what 
criteria should be used to judge the paths.
A more exigent response would be to show that a previous normative formation was unable in 
practice to provide paths of action that would be judged virtuous and good even on its own 
terms. This resembles Hegel's procedure in the Phenomenology of Spirit, which narrates the 
failure of shapes of consciousness to provide paths of action that fulfill their own internal norms. 
Their failure stems from their inability to posit crucial moments in the process of their own 
becoming. 
The Phenomenology is Hegel's richest and his most questionable self-developing sequence. 
Many commentators find segments of it convincing, but few are persuaded that the whole has the 
kind of necessity Hegel claims. Even if the book's progression does not work out in its own 
terms, nevertheless it suggests a method: to examine a normative formation as to whether it can 
meet its own criteria, with an eye to the self-affirmation of larger processes. If such evaluations 
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are possible, and lead to changes, they will bring new dimensions that enlarge the space of action 
when the earlier formation is enfolded into the new.
Some normative formations demonstrate their failure to posit crucial moments by changing into 
new formations that are more authentic to the structure of the process. In such cases, even when 
the change leads to a breakdown of previous social patterns, the new formation can be judged an 
improvement. 
One historical example Hegel offers is drawn from pre-revolutionary France. It is a social 
formation that officially defines itself by an interplay between a central royal power representing 
universal goals and duties, and talented and noble people finding their self-identity in serving 
those universal ends. This seems on the surface a stable and clear set of norms and social roles, 
but the paths of action defined by the norms do not lead where they are supposed to lead, 
because the a crucial moment demands to be posited explicitly: individual free subjectivity.10 
The self-definition of the nobility depends on honor given from a central source. This nobility 
must fashion itself according to norms that gradually change from military glory to witty court 
service. Others become dependent on wealthy bourgeois, who are also fashioning themselves 
according to changing norms. Hegel focuses on a growing awareness in all groups that their 
selves are both identified with and alienated from the social role definition they receive from 
others. As the act of receiving a normatively valid identity from another becomes increasingly 
self-aware, the person's inner self is perceived as a pure process of choice and reception without 
any given natural normative content.
It finds confronting it its own, but alienated, self as such, in the shape of an objective 
fixed reality which it has to receive from another fixed being-for-self. (Phenomenology of 
Spirit 516)
As regards the aspect of that pure actuality which is its very own, its own 
'I', it finds that it is outside of itself and belongs to another, finds its personality as such 
dependent on the contingent personality of another, on the accident of a moment, on a 
caprice, or some other utterly unimportant circumstance. (Phenomenology of Spirit 517)
It is absolutely elastic and . . . rejects this disowning of itself which would make its 
being-for-itself into something alien, and rebels against this reception of itself, and in this 
very reception is conscious of itself. (Phenomenology of Spirit 518) 
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The self-consciousness which rebels against this rejection of itself is immediately 
absolutely self-identical in its absolute disruption, the pure mediation of pure self-
consciousness with itself. (Phenomenology of Spirit 520)
The honest culture of service evolves into a culture of flattery and deceit, together with a group 
of purer people announcing that they are above  such decadence. But that belief is punctured by a 
cynical talk that sees through and ridicules these pretensions, as well as the honor and goodness 
of the noble ideals. 
When the pure 'I' beholds itself outside of itself and rent asunder, then everything that has 
continuity and universality, everything that is called law, good, and right, is at the same 
time rent asunder and is destroyed. All identity dissolves away. (Phenomenology of Spirit 
517)
The self no longer defines itself in terms of universal principles of right and duty. "It exists in the 
universal talk and destructive judgment which strips of their significance all those moments 
which are supposed to count as the true being and as actual members of the 
whole." (Phenomenology of Spirit 521) This historical process, for which Hegel cites Diderot's 
Rameau's Nephew, begins to posit a new moment of negation and pure subjectivity that was not 
explicit in earlier normative formations.11 Hegel sees the Enlightenment as an attempt to find 
public content for this empty self. Later Hegel argues that the Terror in the French Revolution 
attempts to institutionalize a version of this free selfhood, but fails spectacularly.12 
The reason for that failure is revealed in the sections of the Phenomenology where this free 
selfhood turns out to have its own internal moments of universality and particularity that need to 
be posited if it is to be lived without destructive results. The interaction and increasing 
recognition of these moments develop in the Morality section, and they are posited affirmatively 
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content out of itself because it is too negatively defined. "The self sees its self-certainty as such to be 
completely devoid of essence, sees that its pure personality is absolutely not a 
personality." (Phenomenology of Spirit 517) This empty self affirmation will be taken up and reworked in 
the Morality section, with its Kantian echoes.  In the complex structure of the Phenomenology there are 
prefigurings of this movement in earlier sections such as those on Skepticism and the Unhappy 
Consciousness.
12 The failure of the Terror is foreshadowed in this comment about the cynical discourse: "In such talk, 
this particular self, qua this pure self, determined neither by reality nor by thought, develops into a 
spiritual self that is of truly universal worth. It is the self-disruptive nature of all relationships and the 
conscious disruption of them; but only as self-consciousness in revolt is it aware of its own disrupted 
state, and in thus knowing it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity, all content is turned into 
something negative which can no longer be grasped as having a positive significance. The positive object 
is merely the pure 'I' itself, and the disrupted consciousness in itself this pure self-identity of self-
consciousness that has returned to itself." (Phenomenology of Spirit 526) It would be interesting to 
compare this with contemporary postmodern attempts to disrupt false consciousness and false unities; 
there are significant similarities and equally significant differences.
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in the "reconciling yes" at the end of that section. Though public, this mutual recognition still 
lacks institutional authority. Hegel's Philosophy of Right tries to develop a theory of institutions 
adequate to such a complex notion of self and freedom.
The move from a medieval normative formation focused on honor and service to the cynical 
norms of pre-revolutionary France appears to be a degeneration from honesty and noble 
intention. But Hegel sees it as progress because it posits structural moments of human freedom 
that were not given their full due before. The bad effects of the change will be repaired not by a 
return to an earlier simplicity but by positing further moments and mediations still obscured in 
the Rameau formation. So this change can be judged progressive because it moves along the 
process of making human selfhood in society fully self-present and publicly recognized in all its 
dimensions. 
The goal is to develop institutions that show in their operation the process that creates and 
sustains them. In this example the seeming degeneration makes explicitly operative a moment of 
that process. The resulting normative formation is then truer to its own mode of being as 
embedded in a historical process involving the moments that are gradually being posited. In this 
sense it is more authentic. 
Authenticity provides value not so much on its own but as a condition for other important values. 
For instance, in Kierkegaard and Sartre the authenticity of the mode of choosing is supposed to 
guarantee that the values of freedom and subjectivity are affirmed. In Heidegger, who rejects talk 
of values, authenticity demands that a choice or a normative formation be more open to its 
structural temporality and so to the possibility of creative responses and responsibilities, which 
Heidegger judges positively.
But authenticity to process demands that there be some internal structure to the process that 
creates and sustains normative formations. In his novels and plays Sartre writes powerfully about 
people caught in situations that demand revision of their values, and he describes the agonies of 
people torn by past loyalties, their own desires, and envisioned futures.13 Yet in his early 
theoretical writings the moment of decision is insulated from all determination by the past or by 
any personal or social content or inclination. In Being and Nothingness, the man on the cliff path 
is not in anguish at the difficulty of the choice facing him, but at the possibility that a choice will 
occur. He is not in anguish while deciding whether or not the throw himself off the cliff; his 
anguish occurs because he cannot know whether or not in the next moment a redefining irruption 
unconnected with his current self might decide to jump off the cliff. The self, in the ordinary 
sense of an ongoing actor with a definite set of values and tendencies, emerges from a choice that 
has no internal structure and can give no reasons, since that choice creates the framework within 
which reasons will be evaluated. Sartre tries to buttress this theory with a doctrine of the 
fundamental project. A basic choice of style of being provides a framework to which other 
choices can be faithful. But the fundamental project itself exists as a willed continuity that can be 
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broken and changed at any moment.14 There is no fixed patrimony and authenticity is reduced to 
formal compliance with the process of choice, but that blank process can offer no internal 
guidance.
Heidegger shows another variant of the problem. In Being and Time he does not propose a 
disconnected blank choice. He speaks of us as "thrown projects" that find ourselves cast into 
activities and goal orientations already ongoing. We are never in a state of sovereign 
independence with respect to values and possibilities. There are projects and goals that we did 
not establish but that themselves establish our activity. The task of authenticity is not self-
creation but decisive self-re-interpretation. The general lines of our selfhood are predefined by 
the overall "meaning of being" of our time, and by the more particular tasks of our generation. 
Those determinations are not thing-like presences but openings and calls that require further 
definition and interpretation. We can return to the call or project that has opened our situation, 
and find new possibilities not developed in the current configuration of meanings and norms. We 
retrieve the new by moving decisively and creatively as we break through everyday average sets 
of norms and possibilities. This authentic return, however, requires a privileged insight about 
what counts as an appropriate retrieve from the origin. Heidegger had trouble giving content to 
this advice, and his notorious embrace of the Nazi movement shows that the reinterpretation and 
discernment called for lack usable criteria and slip towards social determinism despite his 
rhetoric of heroic isolation. Though Heidegger would not use Hegel's term, the "moments" he 
finds within the process of meaning and norm creation cannot offer the guidance Hegel finds. 
Heidegger's analysis remains formal in a way that Hegel avoids with his self-referential form-as-
content, though this last is purchased at a price too high for Heidegger.15
In Sartre and Heidegger the process that is to become authentic does not have the kind of internal 
structure that might provide guidance about what kinds of choices and changes would be 
authentic and better than their alternatives. Deleuze, by contrast, can recommend particular 
cultural trends and modes of life as more authentic and as providing human freedom and 
flourishing in the terms defined by his ontology of events. In addition, he would say that the 
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14 Sartre tries to argue that authenticity provides a criterion that can guide choice, or at least exclude 
some choices as inappropriate, but his Kantian maneuvers in Existentialism Is a Humanism are not 
successful. Sartre's ideas resemble the thesis of Descartes (and earlier of Al Ghazzali and the Muslim 
Asharites) that God remakes the world anew at each successive moment, and can alter its laws and 
patterns at any time. Al Ghazzali uses the conception of continuous re-creation to deny any notion of 
necessary connection among events, and draws Hume-like conclusions about causality being a fiction 
resulting from habituation. For Al Ghazzali this allows for divine interventions and miracles, because God 
can choose to have any event followed by any other, so the corpse could speak, the cotton refuse to burn. 
The early Sartre allows similar discontinuities within the self. Later, in his rapprochement with Marxism 
he develops a doctrine of dialectical constitution of the self in mutuality, as opposed to any simple 
causality either by social reality or by individual freedom. Whether this succeeds is debated, but at least it 
softens the dualisms of the early Sartre.
15 See the discussions of Heidegger's notion of authenticity in Zimmerman's Heidegger's Confrontation 
with Modernity and his Eclipse of the Self, and the comparisons with Hegel in my Critique of Pure 
Modernity.
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acceptance of the new formation enacts a criticism of the old, showing where it failed in 
comparison with the new. If this were translated into his own concepts, Hegel would agree.16
Juxtapositions
I have been suggesting that something akin to a Hegelian strategy might be implemented without 
the full Hegelian system. But there is a problem: Hegel's logic is meant to provide a definite and 
finite list of the correct moments of the self-positing process. The ways in which those moments 
might be found posited in the spheres of actuality are many and contingent, but the logical 
moments themselves come in a self-generated and closed series. If we have doubts about the 
success of Hegel's self-generating series, should we continue to talk about a process of self-
positing? 
Positing means putting the moments out there institutionally, where they open spaces for action. 
If there are correct moments to the process, and if we have misconceived them, our misguided 
attempts to enlarge our sphere of action should create friction between what we posited and what 
ought to be posited, as in the Rameau example. This is another point on which, for very different 
reasons, Hegel and Deleuze (as well as other more naturalistic thinkers) might agree.
But what if there is no finished list of moments to be posited? Why not endless additions and 
complexities? Another and yet another new political scheme or cultural norm? For instance, new 
artistic movements can be multiplied indefinitely, each further complexifying the institution of 
art. However, even if the process has no end, at some point -- art has already reached it -- the 
institution can explicitly posit the repetitive process itself. Creating new art genres becomes a 
criterion of artistic stature. Novelty is expected; the endless series becomes a return of the same. 
A kind of self-conscious closure envelops the ongoing lower-level novelties.17 This "modern" 
turn is the self-grasp of the structure of processes of change. Such moves to a higher level 
sameness are typical of modern institutions in politics, art, and science. Fundamentalisms in all 
these areas resist such moves. 
The same objection can of course be repeated against the second-level process. But the same 
answer applies: The process that needs institutional positing is the reflective-regressive move 
itself. Positing the process of reflection in institutional terms that can be shared by multiple 
coexisting normative formations -- that is our social, political, and artistic task.
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reference and self-reflection, still has them stand under some quasi-transcendental conditions that can 
judge some normative formations more explicit than others about the unconditional demands and the 
porous unities of the process that lets them be. Thus he can write in criticism of some modes of 
conceiving European unity in The Other Heading, or discuss Marxist visions in Spectres of Marx.
17 In Hegel's terms, this is a move from bad to good infinity. Hegel sees this as inevitable, but Deleuze 
fights against this modernist move by urging the creation of new modes of life that are incommensurable 
with older artistic or cultural institutions. Nonetheless he still talks about the overall moments of the 
process of innovation.
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But who are we? The world is filled with migrants and media. The galactics mentioned at the 
beginning have shown up and, rather than forcing their ways upon us, have settled down next 
door, showing off their ways and wares. Today's world points up limitations in Hegel's version of 
authenticity to process. He thinks about linear, one-stage-at-a-time changes. But we are 
surrounded by juxtaposed normative formations that have no inner relation to our own yet are 
offering themselves along many different directions. We do not have to wait for our possibilities 
of action to be expanded by dialectical development. Possibilities get enlarged by juxtaposition. 
A song here, a food there, a different mode of address, a few foreign words learned, and new 
norms establish themselves.18 Or norms are forced by education, or by economic or political 
pressures. And besides the social osmosis and the social engineering there is the omnipresent 
marketing. 
In this situation, is a notion of authenticity still useful? It can still be useful, because the 
authenticity discussed in this essay is not a matter of faithfulness to some particular pattern or 
value expressed in an earlier normative formation. It is authenticity to a process rather than to a 
patrimony. What makes a change authentic in this sense is that it posits or makes institutionally 
explicit more of the moments or elements of the process that sustains normative formations. In 
the contemporary situation, this could help choose among proffered new customs and values, and 
to distinguish authentic enlargements of action from those resulting from manipulated desires.
Cultural and social juxtapositions need further investigation that might look at such encounters in 
terms of a second level process analogous to the institutionalization of novelty in art. Many 
social critics have emphasized overarching processes which treat juxtaposed cultural differences 
as material for fads and consumerism. This returns the discussion to the issue mentioned briefly 
above about personal life choices and social possibilities. The issue would be whether 
juxtaposition requires an antecedent open field so that the fragments can touch one another. This 
then connects to a basic issue present in most philosophical traditions today: what kinds of unity 
and self-reference are required for the space of meaning and norms to function? And that lands 
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conceptualized them in terms of one dynamically changing cultural formation, northern Europe, faced 
with frozen remnants of older cultural formations such as China and India. He relied on the insulation 
given by spatial distance, and did not think through the relations of non-dialectical difference among 
those formations in their growing presence to one another. Hegel did think about how the pressures of 
bourgeois social economics would lead to colonial trade and exploitation, but he conceptualized that as 
the European model transforming backward formations, not as a relation of difference and mutual 
juxtaposition.
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us in the middle of discussions pioneered by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, which lead toward a richer 
notion of social authenticity as authenticity to process.19 
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